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ANDERSON V. STATE: THE
CONSENT TO SEARCH DOCTRINE
REVISITED
ANDREW G. PERRIN
INTRODUCTION
Picture this: it’s the day before Christmas Eve and you just killed a
pedestrian in a motor vehicle accident. The police arrive, tell you they
have no reason to believe you were at fault, but say they are nonetheless
statutorily obligated to obtain blood and urine samples. They take you
to the police station where you contact your attorney. He is unsure as to
whether you should accede to the police’s demand (perhaps because
you had a beer an hour before the incident) and requests to speak with
the arresting officer to confirm that he in fact has a duty to collect body
samples. Both the officer and his supervisor are confident that they do.
In reality, the police may only perform these tests if they have
probable cause to believe that the subject was at fault, which,
admittedly, the police here do not. However, your attorney, after
speaking with the officers, instructs you to comply with their demand.
Later, a court finds the search illegal but holds the evidence—which is
used to support a conviction for driving under the influence—
admissible because you “voluntarily” consented.
The preceding scenario, based on the Alaska Court of Appeals’
decision in Anderson v. State,1 highlights substantial shortcomings in the
traditional consent to search framework. Because the outcome should
probably have differed under both federal and state precedent, the case
illustrates the ambiguous nature of the Supreme Court’s “totality of
circumstances” analysis, which leads to seemingly unpredictable and
unjust results.
This Note utilizes Anderson to underscore the deficiencies in the
current consent doctrine and proposes a more workable, objective
standard for Alaska to implement. Rather than requiring judges, as the
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1. 246 P.3d 930, 931 (Alaska Ct. App. 2011).
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traditional test demands, to engage in the impossible task of
determining a subject’s state of mind at the time of accession to a search
request, courts should instead examine the police’s actions for coercion
or deception; the existence of the latter circumstances would render
consent involuntary and thus invalid regardless of whether the police
acted in good or bad faith.
This proposal more effectively furthers Fourth Amendment
interests in that it deters unconstitutional conduct by giving the police
an incentive to avoid coercive actions that might undermine the
voluntariness of consent. Unlike the current doctrine, it also better
protects the State judiciary’s integrity by ensuring more foreseeable and
fair results.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Kevin J. Anderson, a forty-five-year-old lawyer, hit and killed a
pedestrian while driving on a snowy Saturday afternoon in December
2006.2 Although the police officer investigating the accident did not
suspect Anderson of wrongdoing, he mistakenly believed that
individuals involved in an accident which resulted in death or serious
injury are required to provide blood and urine samples.3 Anderson was
consequently transported to a police substation, where he contacted his
attorney, Rex Lamont Butler.4 Before contacting Butler, Anderson
refused to submit body samples, even after the officer informed him that
he was statutorily required to do so.5 Anderson also admitted to
consuming a beer more than an hour before the accident, though the
police did not detect any signs of impairment and thus concededly did
not have probable cause to collect blood and urine samples.6
Butler discussed Alaska’s implied consent law with Anchorage
Police Officer Thomas Gaulke before requesting to speak with Gaulke’s
supervisor, Lieutenant Nancy Reeder.7 Both law enforcement officials
mistakenly informed the attorney that, under Alaska’s implied consent
law, his client was required to supply body samples; Anderson
subsequently obliged.8
The state charged Anderson with driving under the influence after
tests revealed a blood alcohol level of .08 percent and that he had
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

Id. at 931–32.
Id. at 931.
Id. at 931–32 .
Id. at 932.
Id.
Id. at 936 (Mannheimer, J., dissenting).
Id. at 932, 936.
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consumed marijuana.9 Anderson moved to suppress the evidence from
his blood and urine samples. The police, he argued, incorrectly advised
him of their authority because, under State v. Blank,10 the police may
only demand samples if they have probable cause.11
The District Court concluded that Anderson had in fact been
illegally detained.12 Nonetheless, the defendant’s consultation with his
attorney prior to the illegal conduct rendered Anderson’s consent
“voluntary.”13 Anderson was later found guilty of driving under the
influence.14

II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A.

Schneckloth and “Voluntary” Consent

The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution (and Section 1.14
of the Alaska State Constitution, for that matter) guarantees “[t]he right
of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures” and that “no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause . . . .”15 Under this basic constitutional
protection, a search conducted without probable cause is “per se
unreasonable . . . subject only to a few specifically established and welldelineated exceptions.”16
One of these exceptions applies when individuals voluntarily
consent to a search.17 Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, a 1973 Supreme Court
case, established the prevailing “voluntariness” doctrine.18 In
Schneckloth, a police officer stopped a vehicle after observing several
burned-out exterior lights.19 The driver and all but one of the six
individuals in the car did not possess a driver’s license.20 When the
police officer asked if he could search the vehicle, the men readily

9. Id. at 931.
10. 90 P.3d 156 (Alaska 2004).
11. Anderson, 246 P.3d at 931.
12. Id.
13. Id. (stating that the district court found that Anderson’s consultation
with his attorney insulated Anderson’s consent from the police officers’ illegal
conduct).
14. Id.
15. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. Notably, Alaska’s constitution contains the exact
same language as its federal counterpart. See ALASKA CONST., art. I, § 1.14.
16. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).
17. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973).
18. See id. at 233 (establishing the ‘totality of the circumstances’ test).
19. Id. at 220.
20. Id.
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acquiesced.21 A brief search revealed three stolen checks, which were
later admitted as evidence against Robert Bustamonte, a passenger in
the vehicle.22
Rejecting the Ninth Circuit’s argument that the State must prove
knowledge of the right to refuse consent, the Supreme Court concluded
that “it is only by analyzing all the circumstances of an individual
consent that it can be ascertained whether . . . it was voluntary or
coerced.”23 A survey of “voluntariness,” as defined in confession cases,
revealed “no talismanic definition.”24 Instead, the term reflects “an
accommodation of the complex of values implicated in police
questioning of a suspect.”25 Broadly defined, the term accounts for the
legitimate need for searches in law enforcement and, at the same time,
“society’s deeply felt belief that the criminal law cannot be used as an
instrument of unfairness.”26
Under Schneckloth, courts attempting to determine whether a
particular instance of consent was voluntary may consider knowledge of
the right to refuse, but “the government need not establish such
knowledge as the sine qua non of an effective consent.”27 To mandate
proof of a subject’s mental state would risk undermining the
admissibility of legitimate evidence in instances where the defendant,
who was in fact aware of his right to refuse consent, simply fails to
testify.28 Nevertheless, the concept of voluntariness contemplates
“evidence of minimal schooling, low intelligence, and the lack of any
effective warnings to a person of his rights.”29
Schneckloth also explicitly noted that consent “granted only in
submission to a claim of lawful authority” is invalid.30 In so doing, the
Court affirmed its earlier holding in Bumper v. North Carolina.31 Bumper
involved an elderly woman who, after being told by police that they
possessed a warrant, permitted them to search her house.32 After the
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 233.
24. Id. at 224.
25. Id. at 224–25.
26. Id. at 225, 227.
27. Id. at 227; see also United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 558–59
(1980) (stating that “[a]lthough the Constitution does not require ‘proof of
knowledge of a right to refuse as the sine qua non of an effective consent to a
search,’ such knowledge [is] highly relevant to the determination that there had
been consent.”) (quoting Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 227).
28. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 230.
29. Id. at 248.
30. Id. at 233.
31. 391 U.S. 543 (1968).
32. Id. at 546–47.
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officers discovered a .22 caliber rifle that was allegedly used in a crime,
the woman’s grandson, who was charged with committing the offense,
moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that the search violated his
Fourth Amendment rights.33 The Court held that “[a] search conducted
in reliance upon a warrant cannot later be justified on the basis of
consent if it turns out that the warrant was invalid.”34 The same is true
“when it turns out that the State does not even attempt to rely upon the
validity of the warrant, or fails to show that there was, in fact, any
warrant at all.”35
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte further underscored that consent may not
be coerced “by explicit or implicit means, by implied threat or covert
force.”36 The Court emphasized that:
illegitimate and unconstitutional practices get their first
footing . . . by silent approaches and slight deviations from
legal modes of procedure. This can only be obviated by
adhering to the rule that constitutional provisions for the
security of person and property should be liberally construed.
A close and literal construction deprives them of half their
efficacy, and leads to gradual depreciation of the right, as if it
consisted more in sound than in substance.37
Account must be taken, therefore, of even the most “subtly coercive
police questions.”38
Schneckloth’s holding was specifically limited to cases where “the
subject of a search is not in custody and the State attempts to justify a
search on the basis of his consent.”39 Unlike the “inherently coercive”
custodial situations “that informed the Court’s holding in Miranda,”40
consent searches generally take place in public, “under informal and
unstructured conditions.”41 As a result, safeguards to protect persons
suspected or accused of a crime, which would include proof of
knowledge of the right to refuse consent, are unnecessary.42
33. Id. at 544–45.
34. Id. at 549.
35. Id. at 549–50.
36. 412 U.S. 218, 228 (1973).
37. Id. at 228–29 (emphasis added) (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S.
616, 635 (1886)).
38. Id. at 229.
39. Id. at 248.
40. Id. at 246–47 (citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 458 (1966)).
41. See id. at 232 (stating that consent searches generally occur on a highway
or in a person’s home or workplace, under informal, unstructured conditions).
42. See id. at 247 (stating that the traditional test for determining
voluntariness, which does not include knowledge of the right to refuse consent,
should not be rejected in situations where a person is not in custody).
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Accordingly, the Schneckloth Court had no reason to believe that, under
the circumstances of a routine traffic stop, a driver’s response to a
policeman’s question is presumptively coerced.43
The Supreme Court further elucidated the Schneckloth standard
three years later in United States v. Watson.44 In Watson, postal inspectors
arrested Henry Watson for possession of stolen credit cards based on
information provided by an informant.45 Officers removed the suspect
from a restaurant to the street and read him the warnings required by
Miranda v. Arizona.46 A search of Watson’s person revealed no stolen
credit cards.47 The police, after warning that anything found could be
used against him, asked if they could search his vehicle.48
Watson, arguing that “his consent to search the car was involuntary
and ineffective because he had not been told that he could withhold
consent,”49moved to suppress the evidence of stolen cards found in his
car. Applying Schneckloth, the Court found that the totality of
circumstances failed to demonstrate that Watson’s consent “was not his
own ‘essentially free and unconstrained choice’ because his ‘will ha[d]
been overborne and his capacity for self-determination critically
impaired.’”50Among other things, Watson gave consent in a public street
as opposed to “the confines of a police station.”51 Also, he consented
only after being read his Miranda rights, and there was no evidence that
Watson was “unable in the face of a custodial arrest to exercise a free
choice.”52
Finally, the Supreme Court explicitly disqualified consent in two
pre-Schneckloth cases where individuals assented in mere acquiescence
to assertions of lawful authority. The Court’s first disqualification
occurred in the context of a prohibition-era liquor law violation.53
Federal officers came to the defendant’s home without a warrant, where
they informed his wife that they had come to search the premises for
violations of revenues law; the wife granted the men access to the
home.54 In overturning the admission of evidence obtained as a result of

43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

Id.
423 U.S. 411, 425 (1976).
Id. at 412–13.
Id. at 413 (citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 225 (1973)).
Id.
Id. at 425.
See Amos v. United States, 255 U.S. 313, 314 (1921).
Id. at 315.
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their subsequent search, the Supreme Court held that “it is perfectly
clear that under the implied coercion here presented” the defendant did
not waive his Fourth Amendment rights.55 The facts demonstrated
“clearly the unconstitutional character of the seizure by which the
property which [the government] introduced was obtained.”56
In Johnson v. United States, the Court also suppressed evidence
obtained by mere submission to authority.57 The police, acting on a tip
by an informant that people were smoking opium at a hotel, followed
the smell of burning opium in the hallways.58 They knocked on the
defendant’s door, and she denied any smell of opium emanating from
her room.59 The officers subsequently stated that the defendant should
consider herself “under arrest because we are going to search your
room.”60 In suppressing the evidence subsequently obtained, the
Supreme Court found that “[e]ntry to [the] defendant’s living quarters,
which was the beginning of the search, was demanded under color of
office. It was granted in submission to authority rather than as an
understanding and intentional waiver of a constitutional right.”61 Thus,
because the defendant consented under the belief that she had no choice
in the matter, the consent to search was not voluntary.
B.

Voluntary Consent and Prior Illegalities

Even if consent to search is voluntarily given, that consent is
invalid if obtained by exploiting a prior illegal act.62 Wong Sun v. United
States confronted the issue of whether declarations made immediately
after an arrest without probable cause are admissible as evidence or
must be excluded.63 Rejecting the government’s argument that the
subject’s statements resulted from “an intervening independent act of
free will,” the Supreme Court found that under the circumstances,
where the police broke through the defendant’s door, promptly and
unjustifiably handcuffed and arrested him, “it is unreasonable to infer
that [the subject’s] response was sufficiently an act of free will to purge
the primary taint of the unlawful invasion.”64
55. Id. at 317.
56. Id. at 316.
57. See 333 U.S. 10 (1948).
58. Id. at 12.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 13.
62. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963).
63. See id. at 484 (holding subsequent declarations inadmissible when
obtained through an agent’s unlawful action).
64. Id. at 486.
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Wong Sun also rejected the government’s alternative contention that
the defendant’s statements should be admitted because they were
“ostensibly exculpatory rather than incriminating.”65 Instead, the Court
found “no substantial reason” to preclude the defendant’s statements
from the exclusionary rule,66 which bars evidence “obtained either
during or as a direct result of an unlawful invasion.”67 The
circumstances were coercive, and the statements were in fact
incriminating, not exculpatory, as “they led directly to evidence which
implicated [the defendant];” the motion to suppress was granted.68
After emphasizing that “knowledge gained by the Government’s
own wrong cannot be used by it in the way proposed,”69 the Supreme
Court formulated a test: the question, in cases where the issue is
whether evidence is ‘fruit of the poisonous tree,’ is “whether, granting
establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to which instant
objection is made has been come at by exploitation of that illegality or
instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the
primary taint.”70
A decade later the Supreme Court reaffirmed Wong Sun’s
requirement that statements made subsequent to an illegal arrest, in
order to be admissible at trial, must be voluntary and made on a
defendant’s own volition.71 Brown v. Illinois held that if the causal chain
between the prior illegality and the statements made is not sufficiently
broken, the evidence falls short of constitutional requirements.72
Brown also underlined that Wong Sun “mandates consideration of a
statement’s admissibility in light of the distinct policies and interests of
the Fourth Amendment.”73 Miranda warnings alone, while sufficient to
effectuate Fifth Amendment interests, are insufficient to deter unlawful
searches and seizures.74 Unequivocally permitting the use of evidence
obtained by virtue of a search that, though without probable cause was
preceded by Miranda warning, would effectively eliminate “[a]ny
incentive to avoid Fourth Amendment violations” and would reduce an

65. Id. at 487 (internal citations omitted).
66. Id.
67. Id. at 485.
68. Id. at 487.
69. Id. at 485 (quoting Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S.
385, 392 (1920)).
70. Id. at 488 (quoting JOHN MACARTHUR, MAGUIRE, EVIDENCE OF GUILT 221
(1959)).
71. See Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 602 (1975).
72. See id. (discussing requirements for the causal chain to be broken).
73. Id.
74. Id. at 601–02.
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essential constitutional protection to “‘a form of words.’”75
Florida v. Royer presents an additional case where the Supreme
Court held that consent, while arguably voluntary, was insufficiently
removed from an illegal arrest to prove that it would otherwise have
been given.76 Royer, who was flying out of Miami International Airport,
was identified by two narcotics detectives as a suspicious individual.77
The police officers took the young man to a storage closet, retrieved his
luggage, informed Royer that they had reason to suspect him of
transporting narcotics, and asked if he would consent to a search of his
luggage.78 In affirming the appellate court’s suppression of the drugs
found in Royer’s suitcases, the Supreme Court highlighted that the
officers’ primary purpose in moving to the interrogation from the
concourse was to search the luggage.79 Had police requested consent to
search in the airport terminal, any evidence obtained would have been
admissible.80 Under the circumstances, however, where the suspect was
effectively in custody, it was unreasonable to infer that consent was
voluntary.81
C.

Alaska Cases

Alaska case law follows U.S. Supreme Court precedent and actually
evinces greater protection of individual privacy, a state privilege that
has been repeatedly affirmed.82 In Erickson v. State,83 for example, a case
decided two months before Schneckloth, Alaska’s highest court noted
that “consent to a search, in order to be voluntary, must be unequivocal,
specific and intelligently given, uncontaminated by any duress or
coercion, and is not lightly to be inferred.”84 Moreover, “‘any new
75. Id. at 602–03 (internal citations omitted).
76. 460 U.S. 491, 502–03 (1983).
77. Id. at 493.
78. Id. at 494.
79. Id. at 505.
80. Id.
81. See id. (“[The] primary interest of the officers [in moving from the
airport concourse to a closet-sized interrogation room] was not in having an
extended conversation with Royer but in the contents of his luggage . . . .”).
82. See Aaron H. Mendelsohn, The Fourth Amendment and Traffic Stops:
Bright-Line Rules in Conjunction with the Totality of Circumstances Test, 88 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 930, 954 (1998) (“The Supreme Court has repeatedly advised
state courts that they may construe their own constitutions to provide broader
individual liberties than those provided under the federal constitution. Likewise,
the Court has advised state courts that they may construe their own
constitutions as imposing more stringent constraints on police conduct than
does the federal constitution.”).
84.507 P.2d 508 (Alaska 1973).
84. Id. at 515 (internal citations omitted).
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exception to the warrant requirement, no matter how reasonable in
terms of its purpose, is viewed with caution.’”85
The Alaska Court of Appeals followed Erickson’s reasoning in a
more recent decision, where it found that mere acquiescence to lawful
authority does not constitute consent, even where a subject expressly
assents to a search.86 The court found, in the context of a supposedly
voluntary consent during an airport security screening, that express
assent is not always sufficient.87 When confronted with an authority’s
supposed lawful right to perform a search, an individual’s decision lacks
the requisite voluntariness to pass constitutional muster.88
Frink v. State,89 another post-Schneckloth decision, also supports the
proposition that Alaska law favors a standard that requires at least some
knowledge of a right to refuse consent. After discussing Erickson, the
court found the defendant’s consent voluntary because he “‘was a
person who knew what his rights were . . . at the time he allowed [the
police] to search his car.’”90 Although law enforcement officials “did not
specifically tell Frink that he had the right to refuse their request, they did
nothing to indicate that he had to comply with their request and the totality of
circumstances surrounding the search does not suggest Frink consented
because his will was overborne.”91
Sleziak v. State,92 also a pre-Schneckloth case, further highlights
Alaska’s generally more stringent protections against involuntary search
and seizure. Acknowledging that search and seizure issues are
adjudicated based on the unique “facts and circumstances,”93 the State
Supreme Court held that “when the accused is directly asked whether
he objects to the search, there must be at least some suggestion that his
objection is significant or that the search waits upon his consent.”94 Only
when “combined with a warning of his right to be silent, and his right to

85. Id. (citing Ferguson v. State, 488 P.2d 1032, 1035–36 (Alaska 1971)).
86. See Schaffer v. State, 988 P.2d 610, 615–16 (1999) (stating that “express
assent is not sufficient. . . . Schaffer’s assent to the search of her belongings was
‘nothing more than acquiescence to apparent lawful authority.’”).
87. Id. at 615.
88. See id. at 614 (“[E]ven if [the express] assent [of the passenger] were
obtained, the choices with which the passenger is confronted are such that
voluntariness will ordinarily be lacking” (quoting WAYNE R. LEFAVE, SEARCH
AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT, § 10.6(g) at 644–45 (3d ed.
1996))).
89. 597 P.2d 154 (Alaska 1979).
90. Id. at 167 (quoting Frink v. State, 1990 WL 10567997 at *1 (Alaska Ct.
App. Nov. 14, 1990)).
91. Id. at 167–68 (emphasis added).
92. 454 P.2d 252 (Alaska 1969).
93. Id. at 256.
94. Id. at 257.
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counsel” is it “fair to infer that his purported consent is in fact
voluntary.”95 This implies that consent, in order to be voluntary, must
not only be given freely, the subject must also be given the option to
refuse consent.
The Court of Appeals has also recently indicated a more stringent
approach to interpreting voluntariness than is required by federal law.
In Brown v. State,96 the court confronted the issue of when a routine
traffic stop becomes unreasonable and unconstitutional, thus
invalidating any subsequent consent to search.97 Concluding that federal
law does not adequately protect motorists, the court joined “state courts
that have decided that their state constitutions require greater
restrictions on police authority in this situation than the restrictions
imposed by the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.”98
Brown found that the psychological pressures inherent in a police
request to search, combined with ignorance of rights, causes “large
numbers of motorists—guilty and innocent alike—[to] accede to these
requests.”99

III. HOLDING
In Anderson, the Alaska Court of Appeals affirmed the District
Court’s Driving Under the Influence conviction and denied the motion
to suppress the blood test evidence. The majority found it was
reasonable for the trial judge to conclude that Anderson’s consent was
voluntary because the defendant had the chance to consult with his
attorney and there was a forty-minute interval between the police’s
initial incorrect assertion of authority and Anderson’s consent to
provide body samples.100
In reaching its conclusion that the consent was not tainted by the
prior illegality, the Court relied mostly on Anderson’s opportunity to
consult with his attorney.101 Writing for the majority, Judge Coates
argued that, had Anderson been unimpaired at the time of the accident,
it would have been in his best interest to unequivocally exonerate
himself by submitting to a blood test.102
The majority further speculated as to what Butler, Anderson’s

95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

Id.
182 P.3d 624 (Alaska Ct. App. 2008).
Id. at 624–25.
Id. at 626.
Id.
Anderson v. State, 246 P.3d 930, 932 (Alaska Ct. App. 2011).
Id. at 931.
Id. at 933.
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attorney, may have advised his client after speaking with the arresting
officer and Lieutenant Reeder. Butler may have made the same mistake
as law enforcement; or perhaps he believed, based on Anderson’s claim
that he had only had one beer, that the blood samples would prove
exculpatory.103
Judge Bolger wrote separately to analyze the case in accordance
with three factors “suggested” by the U.S. Supreme Court in Brown v.
Illinois “for determining whether a confession is tainted: (1) the temporal
proximity of the arrest and the confession, (2) the presence of
intervening circumstances, and (3) the purpose or flagrancy of the
official misconduct.”104 With regard to the first factor, he found that the
forty-minute interval weighed in favor of suppression.105 However, the
opportunity to consult with counsel, the fact that police officers relied on
a statute on good-faith, and their “patient[]” and “polite[]” treatment of
Anderson weighed against suppression on both the second and third
factors.106
In his dissent, Judge Mannheimer emphasized that the police
officers explicitly asserted their right to demand blood samples, and that
this was their stated justification for taking Anderson into custody.107
That they made their demand politely and in good faith, he argued,
“does nothing to alter the involuntariness of Anderson’s decision.”108
Judge Mannheimer also attacked the applicability of the cases on
which Judge Bolger relied to justify Anderson’s consultation with his
attorney as an intervening event.109 They involved situations where “a
defendant, after consultation with his counsel, made a post-arrest
decision to submit to a police interview, or to consent to a search, with
full understanding that the defendant had no obligation to cooperate
with the police investigation.”110 Under such circumstances, courts may
naturally assume that the attorney advised his or her client of their right
to refuse a search.111 Given that both Anderson and his attorney were
repeatedly told that there was no choice but to consent, the latter
assumption does not apply in the instant case.112
Mannheimer also rejected as implausible the possibility that

103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

Id.
Id. (internal citations omitted) (Bolger, J., concurring).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 935 (Mannheimer, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 936.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Anderson acted on accurate legal advice. Instead, the facts indicate “that
Anderson’s attorney acquiesced in the officer’s assertions of authority
and directed his client to provide the body samples.”113

IV. ANALYSIS
The Court of Appeals’ decision in Anderson v. State departs from
established federal and Alaska state precedent. In doing so, it
undermines the fundamental guarantee against unreasonable search
and seizure. The outcome also seemingly falls short of reason: how
could consent, given only in the face of repeated insistence of absolute
authority to compel compliance, be deemed voluntary, especially when
the subject initially refused to consent?
The answer lies in the amorphous nature of the “voluntariness”
doctrine itself, as well as an underlying institutional bias toward
furthering society’s interest in effective law enforcement, particularly
because the evidence sought suppressed is inevitably incriminating. To
prevent future injustice, Alaska should move toward a more objective
test that, instead of relying on a court’s ability to discern an individual’s
state of mind at the time of the alleged consent, would examine the
actions of law enforcement for coercive or deceptive behavior.
A.

Anderson’s Consent Was Not Voluntary

Anderson, in direct contradiction to Schneckloth and Bumper,
validates the voluntariness of consent despite coercive and deceptive
circumstances. In Bumper, the Supreme Court held that an express or
implied claim of authority by the police weighs heavily in favor of
voiding consent.114 Here, both the arresting and supervising police
officers expressly asserted, both to Anderson and his attorney, their
statutory duty to collect blood and urine samples from individuals
involved in serious traffic accidents.115 Anderson refused to oblige until
his attorney, who had no time to conduct independent research,
instructed him to do so.116
While Schneckloth rejected the Ninth Circuit’s argument that the
government must establish knowledge of the right to refuse to prove the
validity of consent, it held that this factor is “to be taken into account.”117

113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

Id.
391 U.S. 543, 549 (1968).
Anderson, 246 P.3d at 936.
Id.
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227 (1973).
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In the case at issue, it is clear that neither Anderson nor the two police
officers were aware of State v. Blank, at the time a relatively recent
Alaska Supreme Court decision holding that the implied consent statute,
to pass constitutional muster, requires police officers to have probable
cause that a crime has occurred before they demand blood and urine
samples.118 The general ignorance of the applicable law by all parties
involved should have factored more heavily in favor of suppression.
In its analysis, the Court of Appeals implied that Anderson’s
opportunity to consult with his attorney, who presumably had
knowledge of basic criminal procedure, conclusively supported a
finding of voluntary consent.119 Given the circumstances of the case,
however, it seems unreasonable to assume that Butler was apprised of
the current state of the law.120 It is implausible, as the majority’s opinion
suggests, that an experienced attorney, whose client admitted to
consuming alcohol before a serious car accident but was not under
suspicion by the police, would instruct his client to voluntarily consent
to a test that could prove incriminating.121 More realistically, the facts
suggest that Butler was as ignorant of the relevant law as everyone else.
Consequently, Anderson’s status as a qualified lawyer, though
used by the majority to support the voluntariness of the defendant’s
consent, also weighs in favor of suppressing the evidence. Anderson
obviously knew how much he had to drink, and must have suspected
that his blood alcohol level exceeded the legal limit. If he had known of
his right to refuse the test in the absence of probable cause, why would
he voluntary consent to provide body samples?
The Court of Appeals also neglected to acknowledge that the
traditional “voluntariness” analysis is confined to instances where the
defendant is not in custody.122 Custodial situations are inherently more
coercive, as people are more likely to succumb to police pressure.
Granted, Anderson had the opportunity to contact his attorney by
phone. However, the court should have at the very least considered the
custodial situation as an additional factor weighing in Anderson’s favor.
Alaska’s appellate court also failed to consider Anderson’s initial
118. 90 P.3d 156, 158 (2004).
119. See Anderson v. State, 246 P.3d 930, 932-33 (Alaska Ct. App. 2011)
(explaining that even if his attorney had been aware of the law he may have
advised Anderson to provide body samples).
120. Id. (“[D]etermining whether Anderson was required by law to submit
blood and urine samples required knowledge of the supreme court’s decision in
State v. Blank.”).
121. Id. at 932.
122. See Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 248 (holding that the traditional ‘totality of
circumstances’ test applies only where “the subject of a search is not in
custody”).
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unwillingness to submit to testing; if, when the events at issue took
place, he did not have reservations about providing body samples,
Anderson presumably would not have felt the need to contact his
attorney. Although the Supreme Court has not said so explicitly,
Professor Wayne LaFave, a Fourth Amendment authority, believes that
a “suspect’s earlier refusal to give consent is a factor which is properly
taken into account as a part of the ‘totality of the circumstances’ in
judging the later consent under the [Bustamonte] formula.”123 The
Anderson majority made no mention of this crucial circumstance.
The totality of the circumstances thus strongly suggests that, as in
Amos and Johnson, Anderson merely acquiesced to a claim of lawful
authority. The police repeatedly asserted their statutory duty to test for
alcohol and drug impairment. The facts do not suggest that Anderson
knowingly and intelligently chose to waive his constitutional rights.
True, the evidence obtained as a result of the illegal search proved that
Anderson was in fact impaired when he killed the pedestrian. But, like
in Amos and Johnson, Anderson’s guilt is irrelevant; the Constitution
does not serve to solely protect the innocent.
While the facts generally weigh in favor of voiding consent under
the federal “voluntariness” standard, Anderson’s consent is more
definitively unconstitutional under Alaska precedent. As indicated
above, Frink implies that a valid consent requires knowledge of the right
to refuse.124 Sleziak suggests that, to uphold consent, there must be clear
evidence the police did not create the impression that they have the
right to conduct a search regardless of the subject’s wishes.125 Here, the
facts imply that Anderson was unaware of his right to refuse and the
police continually asserted their obligation to conduct the search in
question. These facts, in conjunction with the Court of Appeals’ effort to
apply “greater restrictions on police authority in this situation than the
restrictions imposed by the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution,”126 should have made Anderson a relatively
straightforward consent-voiding decision.

123. 4 WAYNE R. LEFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT § 8.2(f) (4th ed. 2004).
124. See Frink v. State, 597 P.2d 154, 167 (Alaska 1979) (finding consent
voluntary because the defendant “knew what his rights were . . . at the time he
allowed [the police] to search his car”).
125. 454 P.2d 252, 267 (Alaska 1969) (stating that there must be some
suggestion by the police that an objection to search is significant or that it awaits
consent).
126. Brown v. State, 182 P.3d 624, 626 (Alaska Ct. App. 2008).
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Anderson’s Consent, Even if Voluntary, is Invalid

Even if Anderson’s consent was arguably voluntary, it is
nonetheless invalid, because the consent came at the exploitation of, and
was not properly insulated from, an illegal arrest. The appellate court’s
reliance on Anderson’s opportunity to consult with his attorney fails to
appreciate the purpose of the exclusionary rule: to deter
unconstitutional conduct. In direct contradiction, the court incidentally
creates a means for the police to circumvent Fourth Amendment
protections by permitting the use of illegally obtained information as
long as the suspect was afforded the opportunity to consult with
counsel.
The Court of Appeals and District Court relied primarily on the fact
that Anderson had the opportunity to consult with his attorney in
justifying the consent as untainted by the illegal conduct.127 In Brown v.
Illinois, however, the Supreme Court stated clearly that Miranda-type
safeguards, which include the right to consult an attorney, are
insufficient to protect Fourth Amendment interests.128 Anderson presents
the type of scenario that the Court presumably contemplated in making
this assertion.
In the context of the Fifth Amendment, Miranda warnings serve to
deter an individual in custody from making incriminating statements
under the “‘the compulsion inherent in custodial surroundings.’”129
With regard to the Fourth Amendment, however, allowing law
enforcement to make admissible statements that would otherwise be
inadmissible by simply giving Miranda warnings would, as the Supreme
Court highlighted, undermine the purpose of the exclusionary rule: to
deter unlawful conduct “‘and compel respect for the constitutional
guaranty in the only effectively available way—by removing the
incentive to disregard it.’”130 Although the police did not act maliciously
in Anderson, the case also creates an incentive for police to improperly
extract admissible evidence by simply claiming ignorance of what the
law actually requires.
Finally, the Court of Appeals neglected to consider the effect of
Anderson’s custodial situation in finding his consent sufficiently
removed from the prior illegality. Royer, as discussed above, implied
that an illegal detention almost invariably taints consent to search.131
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
Florida

Anderson v. State, 246 P.3d 930, 931 (Alaska Ct. App. 2011).
422 U.S. 590, 601–02 (1975).
Id. at 600 (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 458 (1973)).
Id. at 599–600 (quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960)).
See Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 507 (1983) (“[B]ecause we affirm the
Court of Appeal’s conclusion that Royer was being illegally detained
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Thus, irrespective of policy concerns, Anderson’s consent should have
been found invalid.
C.

Problems with the Consent Doctrine

Anderson exemplifies the “voluntariness” doctrine’s inherent
ambiguity. The test demands that courts engage in the task of discerning
a defendant’s inner thoughts at the time he or she gave consent. Given
the difficulty of doing so, courts rarely do more, as Professor Marcy
Strauss has highlighted, than recite factual information followed by
conclusory statements about whether the consent was voluntary.132
Thus, the problem with regard to the doctrine’s application is twofold:
(1) the “voluntariness” test is too vague to provide any real guidance to
courts, litigants, or the police; and (2) it fails to account for the fact that
most people inevitably feel coerced by a police “request” to search.133
These problems, in turn, undermine the integrity of both law
enforcement and the judicial process.
1. Consent Is Rarely Found Involuntary
Although often invoked, the traditional “voluntariness” test rarely
leads to an invalidated consent. Judges seldom attempt to analyze the
numerous subjective Schneckloth factors related to the individual’s
mental state or character.134 In reading every published federal and state
level consent case within a three-year time span, Strauss discovered that
courts overwhelmingly included merely a paragraph on the concept of
“voluntariness,” followed by a statement regarding the state’s burden to
prove that the consent was voluntary.135 Out of hundreds of decisions,
only a handful of cases actually analyzed the defendant’s subjective
mental state at the time of the alleged consent; and even fewer found
these factors sufficiently compelling.136
Consent was invalidated only in instances where, for example, the
defendant spoke no English and received a mistranslated statement
indicating that the police had a permit to search when, in fact, they had
merely requested consent.137 Conversely, consent was validated in cases

when he consented to the search of his luggage, we agree that the consent was
tainted by the illegality and was ineffective to justify the search.”).
132. Marcy Strauss, Reconstructing Consent, 92 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 211,
213 (2001).
133. Id. at 221.
134. Id. at 222.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. (citing Lobania v. Arkansas, 959 S.W.2d 72, 74 (2005)).

PERRIN_V8.0 (DO NOT DELETE)

306

12/9/2012 5:19 PM

ALASKA LAW REVIEW

VOL. 29:2

where the suspect had an IQ of 76 and suffered from psychological
problems, because, as in Anderson, the police behaved nonthreateningly.138 Consent was even upheld in instances where the
defendant was young and uneducated, surrounded by several “large”
officers, and had previously refused police requests to search four
times.139 In another case, consent was found voluntary despite being
granted only after the suspect was arrested, handcuffed, and held on the
ground at gunpoint.140 Shockingly, not a single case considered a
suspect’s ignorance of his right to refuse or the police’s failure to inform
him of his rights as relevant in and of itself.141
While the “voluntariness” analysis, based on “totality of
circumstances,” in theory allows for a context-specific examination, in
practice courts validate consent “‘in all but the most extreme
circumstances.’”142
2. The Traditional “Voluntariness” Doctrine’s Shortcomings
Why is consent, given the government’s burden of proof on the
matter, rarely invalidated? For one, courts are ill equipped to make these
types of determinations. As Strauss explains, “deciding whether a
person’s education, IQ, psychological difficulties, cultural experiences
and past interactions with the police render a consent involuntary is
difficult under the best of circumstances.”143 Thus, when the task is
“undertaken by individuals who typically share none of the fear,
background or beliefs of the suspects, it is not surprising that little
weight is often assigned to these subjective factors.”144
The amorphous nature of the test itself, which provides little
concrete guidance, also leads courts to invariably neglect the doctrine’s
more nuanced aspects. At the same time, judges are inherently guided
by the need to balance privacy rights with a societal interest in effective
law enforcement.
To complicate matters further, courts inevitably consider these
issues in the context of suppressing evidence that was discovered during

138. Id. at 223 (citing State v. Hall, 969 F.2d 1102, 1107–08 (D.C. Cir. 1992)).
139. Id. at 223–24 (citing United States v. Rodney, 956 F.2d 295, 297 (D.C. Cir.
2008)).
140. Id. at 226 (citing United States v. Barnett, 989 F.2d 546, 555–56 (1st Cir.
1983)).
141. See id. at 224 (stating that not a single case found “a suspect’s testimony
that he did not know of his rights and that the police failed to inform him of
them significant on its own”).
142. Id. at 223 (quoting DAVID COLE, NO EQUAL JUSTICE: RACE AND CLASS IN
THE AMERICAN JUSTICE SYSTEM 32 (1999)).
143. Id. at 227.
144. Id.
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the search in question. Because, as would have been the case in Anderson
had the outcome differed, an invalid search causes highly relevant
evidence to be suppressed, “it is not surprising judges place a finger on
that part of the scale that emphasizes society’s interest in promoting
unfettered police investigation.”145 In addition, unlike in the confession
context, the voluntariness of consent does not affect the reliability of the
evidence obtained as a result of the unconstitutional conduct. Thus,
courts are naturally reluctant to find in the defendant’s favor.
The “voluntariness” standard also fails to account for the fact that
most individuals are effectively incapable of denying a police officer’s
request to search. Numerous studies indicate that even under seemingly
non-coercive circumstances, where the police officer is polite without his
gun drawn and the request is made in a ‘comfortable’ environment,
people consent even though they have nothing to gain by doing so.146
Obedience to authority is deeply ingrained, and individuals
consequently agree to things that are not necessarily in their own best
interest; this is especially true when the authority figure in question is
dressed in a uniform.147
Certain minorities, particularly African-Americans, are more likely
to perceive a police request as an unequivocal demand, as they are more
prone believe that a refusal to comply with law enforcement may lead to
serious and deadly consequences.148 In addition, from a linguistic
perspective, a request made by law enforcement effectively
communicates the ability to compel compliance notwithstanding a
subject’s preference, which further explains the general tendency to
interpret a question by the police as a command.149
In sum, the amorphous nature of the traditional voluntariness
doctrine, while intended to allow for context-specific analysis, provides
little objective guidance. In practice, in the face of reliable and
incriminating evidence, courts shy away from the impossible task of
determining a subject’s state of mind at the time he or she gave consent,
and instead grasp any sort of concrete fact to support their conclusion.
Thus, it is hardly surprising that the Anderson majority, perhaps seeking
to avoid seemingly nebulous and speculative reasoning, seized on the
fact that the defendant had consulted with his attorney as an
unambiguous means of justifying its decision to admit the body
145. Id. at 228.
146. Id. at 236 (citing Tracey Maclin, “Black and Blue Encounters”—Some
Preliminary Thoughts about Fourth Amendment Seizures, Should Race Matter? 26
VAL. U. L. REV. 243, 250 (1991)).
147. Id. at 236.
148. Id. at 242–43.
149. Id. at 242.
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samples.
They made this decision, given the undeniably accurate test results,
knowing that Anderson had with virtual certainty violated the law by
driving intoxicated, and naturally inferring that he was therefore likely
at fault in the pedestrian’s death. From their ex-post perspective, it is not
surprising the court would place less weight on amorphous facts
suggesting the defendant’s state of mind.
D.

The Objective and More Effective Framework

Coercion negates consent.150 Unfortunately, the “totality of
circumstances” test provides courts with little clear guidance for
determining when coercion exists. Furthermore, judges tend to examine
a case for both coercion and voluntariness without distinguishing
between the two concepts.151 A coerced consent, at least at some level,
still involves a choice; as a result, courts tend to readily find
voluntariness.152
This Note proposes that Alaska should employ a more objective
test, adopted from the confession context, as part of the established
consent analysis. Instead of focusing on the voluntariness of consent,
courts should evaluate the actions of the police and, where those actions
are coercive or deceptive, invalidate consent regardless of whether the
police acted in good or bad faith. The latter framework is more easily
applied by courts and furthers the declared purpose of the traditional
“totality of circumstances” test—to deter conduct that violates the
Fourth Amendment.153 Also, because it interprets individual freedoms
more broadly than the Federal Constitution, the proposed test does not
implicate the Supremacy Clause.154
As indicated above, the analysis for determining the voluntariness
of consent was in large part derived from the confession context.155 It
thus makes sense, in the search for a solution to the issues presented
with the traditional consent doctrine, to examine relevant evolutions in
the confession framework.

150. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227 (stating that “two
competing concerns must be accommodated in determining the meaning of a
‘voluntary’ consent—the legitimate need for such searches and the equally
important requirement of assuring the absence of coercion.”).
151. Rebecca Strauss, We Can Do This The Easy Way Or The Hard Way: The Use
Of Deceit To Induce Consent Searches, 100 MICH. L. REV. 868, 883 (2002).
152. Id.
153. See Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 602–03 (1975).
154. See Mendelsohn, supra note 82 at 936–37.
155. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 224.
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In Colorado v. Connelly, the Supreme Court emphasized that
confessions should be scrutinized primarily for coercive police behavior
rather than evaluated generally for voluntariness.156 The Colorado
Supreme Court had affirmed the suppression of a confession by a
mentally disturbed defendant, because his chronic schizophrenia and
psychotic state vitiated his waiver of right to counsel and protection
against self-incrimination.157 In reversing the state court, Justice
Rehnquist underscored the difficulty with the “voluntariness” approach
in that “it fails to recognize the essential link between coercive activity of
the State, on the one hand, and a resulting confession by [the] defendant,
on the other.”158 The latter approach requires courts “to divine a
defendant’s motivation for speaking or acting as he did.”159 A focus on
coercion more effectively furthers the Fifth Amendment’s purpose.160
Importing this approach to the consent context would likewise
promote Fourth Amendment interests. An evaluation of coercive or
deceptive circumstances surrounding consent is both more objective and
straightforward than attempting to understand a defendant’s inner
thoughts. Because this framework is more easily applied, courts are
more likely to scrutinize consent and, consequently, less inclined, as
they do now with the focus on subjective factors, to readily find
voluntariness. With its emphasis on police conduct, the proposal also
concentrates more directly on whether consent was “granted only in
submission to a claim of lawful authority”161 and provides a more
effective tool to measure whether consent was freely and voluntarily
given.
The doctrine modification also deters unconstitutional police
action, which, as Joseph Caraccio has underscored, can only be
accomplished by denying law enforcement “both the incidental as well
as the direct benefits of their misconduct.”162 The framework precludes
police from innocently or purposely claiming ignorance of the law as a
means of validating an involuntary consent; consent obtained through

156. See 479 U.S. 157, 169 (“[O]f course, a waiver must at a minimum be
‘voluntary’ to be effective against an accused”); see id. at 163–64 (“while each
confession case has turned on its own set of factors justifying the conclusion that
police conduct was oppressive, all have contained a substantial element of
coercive police conduct”).
157. Id. at 162.
158. Id. at 165.
159. See id. at 165–66.
160. Id. at 170 (noting that Miranda protects defendants against government
coercion leading them to surrender rights protected by the Fifth Amendment).
161. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 233 (1973).
162. Joseph G. Casaccio, Illegally Acquired Information, Consent Searches, and
Tainted Fruit, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 842, 844 (1987).
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coercive or deceptive means, in good or bad faith, is void. Similarly,
consent given after a defendant has the opportunity to contact an
attorney would not be unequivocally valid (as is effectively the case
under the traditional test), because the consent could nonetheless have
been the product of coercion or deception.
As applied to Anderson, the proposed framework would have led to
the opposite outcome. Anderson acceded to the request for body
samples only after both he and his attorney were repeatedly and
incorrectly told that the police are statutorily obligated to obtain them.
By unintentionally deceiving Anderson into believing that he had no
choice in the matter, the police coerced his consent. Moreover, because
the consent was coerced, it was involuntary.
This clear-cut analysis does not require the kinds of subjective facts
and conjecture involved in deciphering a defendant’s state of mind.
Because it focuses on coercive police conduct, the objective test also
incorporates the “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine’s focus on
whether consent was obtained “by exploitation of [a prior] illegality or
instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the
primary taint;”163 a consent to search that is given only because the
defendant is falsely taken into custody, for example, is presumably
coerced. Thus, the proposed standard accounts for both whether consent
was voluntary and whether it was facilitated by prior illegal conduct.
Finally, the proposed rule, which more effectively protects against
unreasonable search and seizure, is in keeping with Alaska’s tradition of
strong privacy rights. Ravin v. State, for example, held that Alaska’s
constitution, unlike its federal counterpart, confers a protected right for
adults to possess marijuana.164 The case, decided in 1975, was
remarkably progressive relative to other states. It emphasized that
Alaska “has traditionally been the home of people who prize their
individuality and who have chosen to settle or to continue living here in
order to achieve a level of control over their lifestyles which is now
virtually unattainable in many of our sister states.”165 When a ballot
initiative in 1999 repealed a law enacted in accordance with Ravin, the
Court of Appeals struck down the initiative as unconstitutional.166
Adopting the proposed amendment to the consent doctrine would thus
hardly constitute Alaska’s first initiative that went against the prevailing
grain in the furtherance of individual rights.167

163.
164.
165.
166.
167.

Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963).
537 P.2d 494, 504 (Alaska 1975).
Id.
Noy v. State, 83 P.3d 538, 542 (Alaska Ct. App. 2003).
See, e.g., Anchorage Police Dep’t. Emps. Ass’n. v. Anchorage, 24 P.3d
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CONCLUSION
The traditional consent doctrine, with its “totality of circumstances”
and “voluntariness” approach, fails to effectively further the Fourth
Amendment’s purpose. Anderson v. State highlights how the framework,
while intended to account for any given set of circumstances, provides
judges with insufficient guidance. As a result, courts find voluntary
consent in all but the most extreme cases. The latter tendency is also
explained by the nature of a suppression case, where the court is
confronted with a motion to suppress reliable and incriminating
evidence, as well as a judicial interest in facilitating effective law
enforcement.
To remedy the federal consent doctrine’s shortcomings, Alaska
should adopt a more objective test that, instead of requiring courts to
telepathically determine whether a defendant’s decision was reached
with sufficient free will, focuses on police conduct: where the police
exhibit coercive or deceptive behavior, in good or bad faith, consent is
involuntary and therefore void. This framework condenses the
“voluntariness” and “fruit of the poisonous tree” analysis into a single
step. More importantly, it leads to consistently predictable and equitable
results.

547, 558 (Alaska 2001) (striking down Anchorage’s random drug testing policy
for police and fire fighters because, in the absence of documented history of
abuse, the “continuous and unrelenting scrutiny that exposes the employee to
unannounced testing at virtually any time” is unconstitutional).

